Sunday, November 08, 2009

New Ibero American Network of Law and New Technologies

More than three months have past since the last posting on this blog and every day that passes it becomes more difficult to re-start to write on it. Not because there are no topics or will to do it but because so many things have happened since the end of July in the e-commerce, IP, IT and related areas that one wouldn’t know where to start from. So, I was waiting for the opportunity, topic that would act as excuse to return to cyberspace and I found it in the creation of the Red Iberoamericana del Derecho y las Nuevas Tecnologias (Ibero American Network for Law and New Technologies) that a friend and colleague, Guillermo Zamora, has started with Marcelo Temperini in Argentina.

The network is presented as a Spanish speaking (at least for now) community of professionals of law and new technologies with the aim of lending a space to be up-to-date, share experiences, ask questions, participate in discussions, Express opinions and, above all, improve relationships. There are three categories of users, or members, which differ in the degree of discount that they receive in the different activities organized by the network, but all having access to most of its features. These features include writing articles, take part in the discussions, recommend legislation or links, organize publications, be part of the network of professionals for the purposes of referrals, invite friends, recommend events and search for information.

It seems that the idea and the platform have been very well thought and the only thing missing is to form part of it…

Friday, July 31, 2009

Too many strange unanswered questions in the McKinnon extradition case

On Friday the English High Court ruled that Gary McKinnon, who fought a long legal battle to avoid being extradited to the U.S. after he was charged with breaking into 97 computers belonging to different branches of the US Government and military in 2001, should face extradition because that represented ''a lawful and proportionate response to his offending.'' Did it?
When one starts to analyse the case there are far too many questions that remain unanswered and make difficult to explain the willingness of English judges to pay such a deference to the US government, which would clearly and legally not do the same if the situation was the other way around. It is important to begin by pointing out that the judiciary is part or a branch of the state that has, as explicit and historic purpose, to serve the interest of the nation (of which its citizens are part). Within that context, even in this world of complex interdependence, the international relations and international agreements of a country have, as ultimate purpose, to give some benefit to a nation and its citizens. Accordingly, to send a country’s citizen to be tried abroad for a crime that has been committed, very likely, both in England and abroad seems very, highly, strangely unusual and it would take from a judge an exercise of imaginative interpretation that would put him very close to disregarding the right to a fair trail, as established by article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998.
There is little doubt about the fact that what McKinnon did in 2001 was and is a crime under both American and English law and, again, it is not easy to explain, regardless the judge and CPS 's spin on it, why a UK national is not tried within UK.
Now, in the unlikely, but possible situation where it is decided that the crime was committed only in the US, can the defendant still be tried in the UK?
Under international law principles, courts can assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on the nexus between the court, the defendant and the crime. Courts can (and normally do) follow the territoriality nexus where the defendant is tried in the forum where the crime was committed. In this particular scenario, deciding where the crime took place would be paramount to know where McKinnon should be tried. Here again, the proper application of statutory and case law to the facts of the case seems to lead to the unequivocal conclusion that a crime has also been committed in the UK. Jurisdiction can also be established based on the nationality nexus, where the defendant is tried within its own country regardless of the place where the offence has been committed. Here again, taking into account that the ultimate purpose of the organization of the state is to act for the benefit of the country and its citizens, courts would normally use this form of asserting jurisdictions where by doing so they understand that a national would not be punished for a crime committed abroad that the home country considers to be serious enough or, on the contrary, the citizen would receive a punishment that results too harsh or disproportionate for that country’s standards. In the case of English law, when dealing with murder and manslaughter, the English courts have jurisdiction over offences committed abroad, if it was committed by a British citizen as established by section 9 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 3 of the British Nationality Act 1948, and confirmed in R v Cheong (2006) AER (D) 385. There have been also plenty of cases recently where the British Government has requested a British national to be sent to England to be tried for crimes committed abroad but that would have a disproportionate sentence in other country. In the case of McKinnon, even in the unlikely case that it is understood that his crime was committed only in the US, English courts have the legal basis to assert jurisdiction over him and try him here, and taking into account the ultimate purpose of the state, already mentioned before, they must do so.
And all of that without entering into the many other questions that the case arises…
Why, taking into account that the article 8 of the US-UK extradition treaty is so imbalanced in favour of the US and also taking into account the known and acknowledged lack of respect for international law and due process to foreigners and in some cases American citizen (has the judge heard about Guantanamo, the Salgado case, Padilla and hundred of others), the judge still thinks that the response is proportionate? Last week a paedophile that raped a boy was sentenced to 4 years of prison here in England while McKinnon could get a sentence several times longer in the US for entering into those computers looking for information about UFOs, is that proportional? Why the press keeps referring to the hacker “breaking” into the American sites when the hacker actually “entered” into them? (the difference is fundamental because in the non-virtual space it is radically different to be accused of trespass than to be accused of burglary and in the present case McKinnon entered into sites that had the password left blank so he actually did not "break" into those computers). Why the judge is so keen to extradite a British citizen with such a dubious legal basis when higher English courts have refused to extradite foreigners that committed crimes much more serious? In sum, in most countries (developed and not) a ruling that leaves so many strangely unanswered questions would merit an investigation into the judge’s conduct…

Ruling against Google and Yahoo in Argentina

A district court in Argentina has ruled that Google and Yahoo have to pay A$ 50,000 in damages for indexing pages where the name of Virginha Da Cunha and her image have been linked to sexual and erotic content. The claimant, an actress, singer and composer (not being in Argentina never heard about her before), sued the search engines alleging the illegal use of her image and claiming A$ 50,000 in material and “moral” damages from each of the named search engine companies.

The judge Virginia Simari, has understood that the search engines are also Internet sites and that their owners decide what contents are included on them. She also considered that “the activities of the defendants facilitate the access to sites that otherwise would be of difficult access and that, in addition, such a facilitation constitutes de node of one of their activities”. “Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the search engines by contributing to the access to the websites are in the best technical conditions to prevent the damages, and it is that profile of the search engines that generates their facilitating activity liability”.

The judge also considered that the fact that the claimant’s professional activity requires her public exhibition in different manners does not legitimate any kind of use of Da Cunha’s image by third parties. She went on explaining that “the standard to measure the damage caused to somebody’s image is conformed by the context where the images in question are presented. In the present case the existence of images of the claimant on websites of sexual, erotic, pornographic content does not leave place to doubt about the impact on the claimant’s image”.

Needless to say that it is expected that both Google and Yahoo will appeal the ruling, but what is peculiar is the way that the judge links seamlessly the damage caused by the offending sites with the search engines that allow people to find them. It is similar to finding the maker of telephotos or zooms liable for the breach of privacy that a paparazzi may commit, or car maker liable for robberies committed by car (or the council that has responsibility for the street where the car is driven to the robbery). But it shows a bigger problem that is starting to arise in jurisdictions like the Argentine, that have a sophisticated legal culture and system and also a fairly litigious nature but judges with no understanding of Internet and new technologies functioning or their peculiar legal principles. Some time ago we discussed the string of domain name disputes judicial decisions where Argentine judges found always in favour of trademark owners when the other party had also a legitimate right to the domain name (as, for example, a family name), and here we have the same situation again. It probably relates to the fact that to be a judge in Argentina you need to be a lawyer and to be a lawyer in Argentina you don’t need to know any thing about ICT law nor you can, as all but one universities don’t have any class on the topic…

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Blackboard software patent litigation, round...whatever

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits ruled on Monday that part of Blackboard’s U.S. Patent No. 6,988,138 (“the ’138 patent”), which claims an Internet-based educational support system and related methods, is invalid, and reversed the lower court decision that imposed damages of U$S 3,300,000 to Desire2Learn for infringing that patent. The later company has always argued that Blackboard course management patents are overly broad and were issued improperly, which, as noted by the Court, would run against the principles established in Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“consideration of the understanding of one skilled in the art in no way relieves the patentee of adequately disclosing sufficient structure in the specification”). The ruling still leaves some of Blackboard’s claims standing, which, in addition to the already announced appeal, promises to lead to yet more litigation on the matter…

Wednesday, July 08, 2009

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (or the misadventures of proper parenting in an online world)

Newspapers carry the news that yet another girl has been abducted after online grooming and it seems that we could have a news service devoted to things that children have been doing (and they shouldn’t) online and/or what some depraved people have done (or tried to do) to children by using Internet. Probably more than half of the time/space of that news service would be filled with analysis about how dangerous new technologies in general and Internet in particular are for children…and they would be wrong. Information technologies and Internet have the potential to allow children to reach places that we couldn’t dream about when having the same age or allow them to interact with people across the globe and learn about other cultures in ways that no book or library would, but in the same way that children need to be taught how to read, they need to be taught about how to use ICT…and most parents neglect that.
A recent survey suggests that only one in ten parents talk about Internet safety with their kids and there are some cases where parents get quite amused when their kids wander alone online and get into things that they shouldn’t: take as example the 3 years old kid that bought a real digger online when the parents were sleeping…the mother reaction was “It's been a lot of fun”…was it? Or it was a monumental example of irresponsibility from the parents? Would the mother have the same reaction if instead of buying a digger the kid put herself in contact with another “online kid” that then turned out to be a grown up paedophile (like the recent case in Spain)?
It has been repeated hundreds of times but it doesn’t hurt to do it again; Internet is not the problem but parents that use it as an easy way to keep children entertained instead of guiding them through the intricacies of cyberspace, and there is no regulation that can solve that problem. There is, however, an argument that governments and international organizations should devote more resources to the education and information of parents instead of wasting resources in twisting and violating long established legal principles to maintain the profits of industries with obsolete business models. Governments could, for example, mandate the inclusion in the computer manuals and in the ISP connection packs some form of booklet teaching parents the basics of online safety and that would certaintly be better received than forcing ISPs to control users downloading patterns...

Friday, June 19, 2009

A ruling of U$S174,545.45 per song and a result that the RIAA should cry for

In Capitol v Jammie Thomas-Rasset the jury just handed down a sentence of U$S1,920,000 against the defendant for the wilful copyright infringement of 24 songs, which they found Mrs Thomas-Rasset made available for others to download through Kazaa. The claimant (plaintiff in the case because is in the US), Capitol Records, alleged that the defendant made available to others thousands of songs but it decided to concentrate on 24 songs for which it had more evidence. At the end, it seems that the claimants specialists could only link 11 songs to the defendant’s computer, so the actual tag is not U$S80,000 per song as the jury decided but U$S174,545.45 per song (for the other 13 songs even the claimant’s specialists recognized that they couldn’t probe that they had been actually shared). For the remaining 11 songs, there are suggestions that all the evidence was circumstantial, although a lot of it.
The legal issues that the ruling raises are so many and so contentious that several papers can be written out of it (which for sure they will), but there are a couple that stand out as especially relevant. The first is the clarification that the music industry argument that “making available for download” is copyright infringement in the US is wrong. The case had to be retried because in the original case the judge had instructed the jury that making available for downloading was copyright infringement, which clearly contradicted the letter and spirit of the law. In the new trial, there was some evidence, albeit circumstantial, that somebody had downloaded 11 songs from the defendant’s computer, making her liable for copyright infringement by distributing the protected content (one of the exclusive acts reserved for the copyright holder). The other issue is the amount of damages.
The “loss” of the music industry would be in the range of 70 cents per song, which is what it would get of the 99 cents paid for legally downloading each of the songs in questions, so getting an award of U$S174,545.45 per song seems a “little” excessive and, even more, unconstitutionally excessive. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003), 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a punitive damage award of $145 million when compensatory damages were $1 million were excessive and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the ruling, compensatory damages have as purpose to compensate a plaintiff for a loss, while punitive damages act as a deterrence and retribution and serve the same purpose as criminal penalties. Civil defendants are not afforded constitutional protections given to criminal defendants, therefore, there is a danger of deprivation of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court used BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, where it was established that three factors have to be considered in assessing punitive damages:

1) the degree of reprehensibility of misconduct;
2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damage award; and
3) the difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparative cases.

Futhermore, in order to determine the reprehensibility of misconduct, the most important factors must be:

1) the harm is physical rather than economic;
2) the conduct exhibits indifference or reckless disregard to the health or safety of others;
3) the conduct involves repeated actions rather than an isolated event; and
4) the harm results from intentional malice, trickery or deceit, not just an accident.


Needles to say that the conduct of the defendant Jammie Thomas-Rasset does not get even close to any of the necessary factors needed to justify such a disproportion between the actual loss and the punitive damages.
The RIAA should better put the champagne back in the fridge because when they think that they have won, they actually have handed on a silver plate to those in favour of digital freedom the opportunity to clearly establish that making available for download is not copyright infringement in the US (as already decided) and that their damages cannot not be as outrageous as they currently are.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Harry Potter yet again in court (or trying to get millions magically)

The Australian Daily Telegraph brings the news that the estate of Adrian Jacobs is suing JK Rowling’s publisher, Bloomsbury, for copyright infringement and claiming £500 million. The suit has its origin on the allegation that Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire contains the same concepts presented in Jacobs’ Willy the Wizard, a 36 page book of which 1,000 copies were made.

According to the newspaper, the claimants argue that

Both Willy and Harry are required to work out the exact nature of the main task of the contest which they both achieve in a bathroom assisted by clues from helpers, in order to discover how to rescue human hostages imprisoned by a community of half-human, half-animal fantasy creatures, the merpeople in Harry Potter, Mr Markson said in a statement to The Daily Telegraph.

"Many other similarities are described in the Claim filed by the Estate, which include the idea of wizards travelling on trains, famously referred to in Harry Potter as the Hogwarts Express.

"It is alleged that all of these are concepts first created by Adrian Jacobs in Willy the Wizard, some 10 years before JK Rowling first published any of the Harry Potter novels and 13 years before Goblet of Fire was published.

"It is also alleged that, at the time in trying to get his work published, Mr Jacobs sought the services of a literary agent, Christopher Little, who also later became Ms Rowlings literary agent in the Harry Potter series.

Leaving apart the issue that Jacobs’ book was in the hands of whom then became JK Rowlings agent, it seems that the whole lawsuit is based on some ideas being similar and there is where things are difficult to understand. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 in its section 16 (3) makes clear that, subject to some exceptions, it is not necessary to copy the whole work, but it has been clarified in Warwick Film Productions Ltd v Eisinger (1969) that a substantial part of it should be reproduced in order to have infringement. Here it is important to remember that substantial refers to the quality more than the quantity of the copy, as explained by Lord Reid in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd (1964). Furthermore, substantiability refers to being substantial in the copied work and not in the copying one, as decided in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (1998) reaffirmed by the House of Lords in 2001(it would not be a defence to say that Willy the Wizard is one tenth of the Goblet of Fire, because the suit does not claim that JK Rowling is not creative, it claims that Jacobs’ work has been copied). So, it first has to be established how much of the Jacobs’ work is constituted by the parts referred to above.

The other issue relevant to copyright infringement is to address whether the protected work has been reproduced or not and to establish that we need to look at how similar both works are and then if the similarity has been brought by the act of copying. The previous discussion makes clear that the infringing work needs not be identical, but it can be argued that courts have made a huge disfavour to the certainty and clarity of this issue by blurring too much the distinction between expression and idea, distinction that is central to the concept of copyright. The case Ludlow Music Inc v Robbie Williams (2001) is a prime example of courts making an appalling mess of the law of copyright by finding infringement due to one song taking its central idea from other (yes, there is not mistake, the court did refer to copying the idea as infringement!). Generally speaking, the infringing work should reproduce the original in some form, although this does not imply exact word-by-word copying. CDPA 1988 s16 (3)(a) makes clear that reproduction does not need to be exact, which has been interpreted as covering the way of arranging ideas too, in Harman Pictures NV v Osborne (1967). Finally, it is the case Ravenscroft v Herbert (1980) the one that may give the claimants some hope of success because it establishes that an author cannot use the language and arrangement of facts of a previous work (artificially protecting ideas without saying so).

Fortunately, the Da Vinci Code case, Baigent v Random House Group Ltd (2007) put some rationality in the common law arena and established that facts, themes and ideas were open to anyone to use (although the claimants got away with using the courts to make their previously unknown book a best-seller).

So, is this a genuine case or a way to try (yet again) to use courts to change the fact that a writer has written a book that few people want to buy and other has written a different book with some similarities that has sold millions of copies around the globe? The situation is not helped by the involvement of a publicist promoting the action and making a point that Mr Jacobs died penniless and JK Rowling is a billionaire. The law of copyright shouldn’t be concerned with the fact that an ignotus author died poor due to losing everything in the stock market (unrelated to the book or the current action) and it shouldn’t be affected by the sympathy that a publicist is trying to attract to his (?) cause (by the way, in a system with no juries, shouldn’t you get a good lawyers instead of a publicist? or the whole lawsuit is just to make money by becoming a “celebrity”?). But there is quite strong argument that courts are to blame for this type of lawsuits.

In England the characteristics of common law give some flexibility to the law but they also mean that many cases are decided based on the personal preferences of the judges (what is always strongly denied by them or common law analysts), who many times use their rulings to relax or restrict principles that are quite well defined in other jurisdictions., like the distinction between expression and idea. And on the policy side, why a court should protect the way that facts, information and ideas are presented by someone, not the way they are expressed, when other person uses the same way but expresses them in a form that is preferred by the public? Even more, courts in this side of the Atlantic seem to be lenient to claimants that use the courts to change their lack of success in the market even when the claim can be understood as frivolous and without merit. Across the pond, however, courts have been less reluctant to deal nicely with this type of lawsuits and in Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer 221 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) the judge fined Ms Stouffer U$S50,000 for her “pattern of intentional bad faith conduct” and in Canada a judge ordered Kim Baryluk, the song writer behind the almost unknown The Wyrd Sisters band that sued Waner Bros for CAD40,000 for…no reason, to pay the CAD140,000 legal costs of the defendant.

Isn’t it time that courts make clear in England that if the public does not like your creation courts are not there to give you a hand paying your bills? And also, although it is true that due to the robes and wigs English courts look like Hogwarts, it is also time that people understand that they are not a place where lack of talent can be magically transformed into millions...

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Is The Times using courts to curtail potential competition?

Today The Times has announced proudly that a “Landmark ruling lifts lid on police blogger”, referring to a case that The Times won against the author of the Nightjack blog (who tried to get an injunction preventing The Times from revealing his name). But is it something to be really proud of? Or, like the music industry using courts to stop the unstoppable and try to save a failed business model, The Times just found an easy case to undermine the activities of some bloggers and went for the part (their anonymity) that may discourage many from revealing some news? Isn’t it the case that the ruling in question will come to hunt newspapers in general and The Times in particular when in the future they try to keep the anonymity of a source that got the information breaking some rule?

The arguments of The Times could be summarized in saying that the name of the blogger did not deserve protection because he was a policeman that was breaking police rules and, therefore, there was public interest in knowing the name of such a rule-breaking public servant. This is a very strange and dangerous proposition to be put forward by a newspaper; haven’t they heard about the Pentagon Papers? Do they think that those that gave the papers to the New York Times and the Washington Post had the authorization to do that? Or probably when The Times published an article on June 29, 1972, referring to and explaining the contents of the Papers did not matter that they had been obtained by breaking the rules (actually a quite serious law in the US)? One of The Times analysts tries to make a link between the ruling and freedom of information, clearly ignoring the quite precise meaning that freedom of information has in that setting. class="MsoNormal">Finally, The Times also engages in some silly form of character assassination by trying to show how bad the activities of the blogger were, but nothing helps to change the sensation that, legalities apart (the disputable ruling of the judge deserves a full paper on it), something is quite wrong on the ethical side of The Times.

Interestingly enough, one of the “analyses” of the ruling that appears on The Times ends by trying to preempt the obvious saying that “ironically [...] there will be plenty of bloggers who […] ‘will argue it has a chilling effect that will deter bloggers from putting information out there’”, quoting an, of course, anonymous lawyer…