Monday, August 27, 2012
SID 2012
Monday, August 13, 2012
The Return of Electromate/El Regreso de Electromate
After exactly two years without posting on this blog, I think that is time to return to it and to post the same sort of things as before but with more of a bilingual touch so to write in English things that happen in the Spanish speaking world and viceversa...if the force so allows me.Monday, August 23, 2010
"Facebook" list wins elections
A list composed by candidates that met through a Facebook group won the local elections at the beach town of El Condor in the Argentine Patagonia. The list, number 12 for the purposes of the election won the electoral contest against the incumbent, list number 7, getting almost 68% of the votes.El Condor is a village by the sea in the Argentine Patagonia known for its extense beaches, the shallow sea and the practice of kite surfing. It also has the biggest colony of burrowing parrots in the world and it presents visitors with ample opportunities for both shore and boat fishing.
The election had other IT particularity because one of the poll stations was set up using an electronic ballot box, which constitutes a novelty for the region.
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Facebook’s new lawsuit
Paul D. Ceglia has filed a lawsuit in a New York Court alleging that he owns 84% of Facebook and, although Facebook is trying to dismiss it as a frivolous lawsuit, the Judge has found it to have enough entity to order a freeze in all asset transactions for Facebook. The issue arises from an allegation made by the plaintiff (claimant in England) that the current Facebook CEO, Zuckerberg, was paid U$S1000 to build the site, on which Ceglia kept 50% of the interest that grew 1% per day from January 1st 2004 until the day of completion, February 4th 2004. This implies that Ceglia owns 84% of the resulting site.Consumer Report also does not recommend iPhone 4
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Disregard for the market and the Apple myth
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Lack of technological neutrality as indirect discrimination
Wednesday, April 07, 2010
Divorce by SMS in Arab countries and the validity of electronic documents
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
GiKii goes back home
Tuesday, March 02, 2010
Call for papers for the Argentine Symposium on Informatics and Law (SID)

39 JAIIO - 39 JORNADAS ARGENTINAS DE INFORMÁTICA -
30 de Agosto al 3 de Septiembre de 2010
Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
SADIO, la Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa organiza desde hace 38 años las JAIIO (Jornadas Argentinas de Informática e Investigación Operativa) integrando trabajos, investigaciones y actividades bajo un mismo evento. Las JAIIO constituyen uno de los eventos más importantes del sector informático nacional y regional, con presentaciones y exposiciones provenientes tanto de la academia como de la industria.
La organización de las JAIIO contempla un conjunto de simposios separados por área temática, entre las que se incluyen: ingeniería de software, inteligencia artificial, tecnología, agroinformática, high-performance computing, informática industrial, software libre, derecho, salud, sociedad de la información, y un concurso de trabajos estudiantiles. Luego de varios años, las JAIIO vuelven a tener sede en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.
SID 2010 - SIMPOSIO ARGENTINO DE INFORMÁTICA Y DERECHO
30 y 31 de Agosto de 2010
Mucho tiempo ha pasado desde 1961, en que se iniciaron las JAIIO. El mundo fue cambiando y la presencia de la tecnología en general y de la informática en particular se fue incorporando en la vida de amplios segmentos sociales.
En este devenir de las JAIIO, en el 2001 nace el Primer Simposio Argentino de Informática y Derecho (SID), en cuyo seno se empieza a discutir, en la Argentina, la incipiente pero necesaria relación entre la informática y el derecho.
Mucho se ha avanzado desde entonces en la relación entre Derecho e Informática, pero son cada vez más las cuestiones que, en razón del desarrollo tecnológico, la realidad nos propone y es cada vez más necesaria la búsqueda de la excelencia, la creatividad, y el esfuerzo compartido para avanzar en un único y superior sentido: el mejoramiento de la sociedad. De ahí la permanente actualidad, vigencia y crecimiento del SID.
Con el mismo espíritu pionero del primer día, la comunidad académico-científica de "Informática y Derecho" de Latinoamérica, se reúne en Buenos Aires, en torno al SID 2010, para compartir, aprender, debatir y proponer.
CHAIRS DEL SIMPOSIO
-Prof. Abog. Noemí Olivera, GECSI, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina
-Prof. Dr. Aires José Rover, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
COMITÉ ACADÉMICO DEL SIMPOSIO
-Aída Noblia (AEU, Uruguay)
-Ana Haydee Di Iorio (Fasta, Argentina)
-Araceli N. Proto (CIC FI.UBA, Argentina)
-Ariel Vercelli (UNQ, Argentina)
-Bibiana Luz Clara (Fasta, Argentina)
-Carlos E. Bisso (UNLP, Argentina)
-Carola Canelo (Universidad de Chile, Chile)
-Clara Smith (UNLP, Argentina)
-Claudio Augusto Delrieux (UNPA, Argentina)
-Erick Iriarte Ahon (ALFA-REDI, Perú)
-Fernando Barrio (UNRN, Argentina)
-Fernando Galindo (Universidad de Zaragoza, España)
-Fernando Greco (Ministerio Público de la Provincia de Buenos Aires)
-Gustavo Presman (USAL, Argentina)
-Horacio Fernández Delpech (Presidente ADIAR, Argentina)
-Hugo Cesar Hoeschl (IJURIS, Florianópolis, SC ? Brasil)
-José Miguel Busquets (Universidad de la República, Uruguay)
-Juan Carlos Ponz (UNLP-CALP, Argentina)
-Leopoldo Sebastián Gómez (Poder Judicial Neuquén, Argentina)
-Marcelo Riquert (UNMdP, Argentina)
-María de las Nieves Cenicacelaya (UNLP, Argentina)
-María Florencia Franchini (UNLP, Argentina)
-María Laura Spina (UNL, Argentina)
-Nora Chaponick (INFOLEG, Argentina)
-Orides Mezzaroba (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil)
-Ramón Brenna (UBA, Argentina)
-Rita Gajate (UNLP, Argentina)
-Ricardo Sebastián Piana (UNLP, Argentina)
-Roberto N. Bugallo (UBA-UNCPBA-UNLP)
-Tania Cristina D'Agostini Bueno (Universidade Federal de Santa, Catarina, Brasil)
CALL FOR PAPERS SID 2010
El Comité Académico del Simposio Argentino de Informática y Derecho convoca a los autores interesados a presentar sus trabajos, en las siguientes modalidades:
-Investigaciones que contengan aportes novedosos y debidamente sustentados y que no estén siendo presentados en otras conferencias. (1)
-Prestaciones de casos reales que demuestren impactos significativos, positivos o no, en la gestión informática del derecho.
En ambas modalidades se deberá hacer hincapié en la generación y transmisión de conocimiento que pueda ser apropiado por otros.
(1) En caso que el trabajo sea afín a más de un simposio de las 39 JAIIO, presentarlo indicando los simposios a los que considera puede ajustarse para su evaluación conjunta.
TEMÁTICAS DE LOS TRABAJOS
Los trabajos a presentar deben estar directamente relacionados con, por lo menos, alguna de las siguientes temáticas, sean trabajos disciplinares de Derecho o Informática o interdisciplinarios:
-El Derecho en la Sociedad de la Información.
-El Derecho Informático.
- La privacidad en entornos digitales.
-La propiedad intelectual en la Sociedad de la Información.
-Teletrabajo.
-Comercio electrónico.
-Derechos del Consumidor de productos y/o servicios informáticos.
-Correo electrónico.
-Firma Digital.
-Factura electrónica.
-E-banking: Modelos, problemas, operatorias, seguridad.
-Delitos Informáticos.
-Pericias informáticas.
-Jurisdicción y competencia en la red.
-Resolución de conflictos en el entorno electrónico.
-Gobierno electrónico.
-Democracia electrónica.
-Redes sociales.
-Archivos digitales.
-Informática jurídica.
-Seguridad informática.
-Ontología aplicada al derecho.
-Inteligencia Artificial y Derecho.
PRESENTACIÓN DE LOS TRABAJOS
-Las instrucciones detalladas para la presentación de trabajos serán publicadas a la brevedad en el sitio web del simposio
-Los autores deberán indicar si consideran que sus trabajos pueden ser compartidos con otros simposios.
-Los autores de trabajos aprobados podrán ser invitados a exponer los mismos durante el desarrollo del Simposio.
-Los trabajos deberán tener un máximo de 15 páginas en papel A4 y deben incluir un abstract de hasta 200 palabras, en español o portugués y en inglés El formato de los trabajos es .pdf, cuya plantilla puede descargarse de http://www.springer.com/computer/lncs/lncs+authors?SGWID=0-40209-0-0-0
. Se recomienda muy especialmente respetar el formato especificado.
-Los artículos deberán estar escritos en: castellano, portugués o inglés.
-Al menos uno de los autores de los trabajos aprobados deberá estar registrado en la conferencia con anterioridad a la fecha limite para la presentación definitiva de trabajos (camera ready) a fin de que el mismo sea considerado para su publicación.
FECHAS IMPORTANTES
Fecha límite para la recepción de trabajos: 03 de mayo de 2010 Notificación a los autores: 14 de junio de 2010 Fecha límite para la presentación definitiva de trabajos (camera
ready): 28 de Junio 2010
Inicio de las 39Jaiio: 30 de agosto
Sunday, November 08, 2009
New Ibero American Network of Law and New Technologies
More than three months have past since the last posting on this blog and every day that passes it becomes more difficult to re-start to write on it. Not because there are no topics or will to do it but because so many things have happened since the end of July in the e-commerce, IP, IT and related areas that one wouldn’t know where to start from. So, I was waiting for the opportunity, topic that would act as excuse to return to cyberspace and I found it in the creation of the Red Iberoamericana del Derecho y las Nuevas Tecnologias (Ibero American Network for Law and New Technologies) that a friend and colleague, Guillermo Zamora, has started with Marcelo Temperini in
The network is presented as a Spanish speaking (at least for now) community of professionals of law and new technologies with the aim of lending a space to be up-to-date, share experiences, ask questions, participate in discussions, Express opinions and, above all, improve relationships. There are three categories of users, or members, which differ in the degree of discount that they receive in the different activities organized by the network, but all having access to most of its features. These features include writing articles, take part in the discussions, recommend legislation or links, organize publications, be part of the network of professionals for the purposes of referrals, invite friends, recommend events and search for information.
It seems that the idea and the platform have been very well thought and the only thing missing is to form part of it…
Friday, July 31, 2009
Too many strange unanswered questions in the McKinnon extradition case
When one starts to analyse the case there are far too many questions that remain unanswered and make difficult to explain the willingness of English judges to pay such a deference to the US government, which would clearly and legally not do the same if the situation was the other way around. It is important to begin by pointing out that the judiciary is part or a branch of the state that has, as explicit and historic purpose, to serve the interest of the nation (of which its citizens are part). Within that context, even in this world of complex interdependence, the international relations and international agreements of a country have, as ultimate purpose, to give some benefit to a nation and its citizens. Accordingly, to send a country’s citizen to be tried abroad for a crime that has been committed, very likely, both in England and abroad seems very, highly, strangely unusual and it would take from a judge an exercise of imaginative interpretation that would put him very close to disregarding the right to a fair trail, as established by article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998.
There is little doubt about the fact that what McKinnon did in 2001 was and is a crime under both American and English law and, again, it is not easy to explain, regardless the judge and CPS 's spin on it, why a UK national is not tried within UK.
Now, in the unlikely, but possible situation where it is decided that the crime was committed only in the US, can the defendant still be tried in the UK?
Under international law principles, courts can assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on the nexus between the court, the defendant and the crime. Courts can (and normally do) follow the territoriality nexus where the defendant is tried in the forum where the crime was committed. In this particular scenario, deciding where the crime took place would be paramount to know where McKinnon should be tried. Here again, the proper application of statutory and case law to the facts of the case seems to lead to the unequivocal conclusion that a crime has also been committed in the UK. Jurisdiction can also be established based on the nationality nexus, where the defendant is tried within its own country regardless of the place where the offence has been committed. Here again, taking into account that the ultimate purpose of the organization of the state is to act for the benefit of the country and its citizens, courts would normally use this form of asserting jurisdictions where by doing so they understand that a national would not be punished for a crime committed abroad that the home country considers to be serious enough or, on the contrary, the citizen would receive a punishment that results too harsh or disproportionate for that country’s standards. In the case of English law, when dealing with murder and manslaughter, the English courts have jurisdiction over offences committed abroad, if it was committed by a British citizen as established by section 9 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 3 of the British Nationality Act 1948, and confirmed in R v Cheong (2006) AER (D) 385. There have been also plenty of cases recently where the British Government has requested a British national to be sent to England to be tried for crimes committed abroad but that would have a disproportionate sentence in other country. In the case of McKinnon, even in the unlikely case that it is understood that his crime was committed only in the US, English courts have the legal basis to assert jurisdiction over him and try him here, and taking into account the ultimate purpose of the state, already mentioned before, they must do so.
And all of that without entering into the many other questions that the case arises…
Why, taking into account that the article 8 of the US-UK extradition treaty is so imbalanced in favour of the US and also taking into account the known and acknowledged lack of respect for international law and due process to foreigners and in some cases American citizen (has the judge heard about Guantanamo, the Salgado case, Padilla and hundred of others), the judge still thinks that the response is proportionate? Last week a paedophile that raped a boy was sentenced to 4 years of prison here in England while McKinnon could get a sentence several times longer in the US for entering into those computers looking for information about UFOs, is that proportional? Why the press keeps referring to the hacker “breaking” into the American sites when the hacker actually “entered” into them? (the difference is fundamental because in the non-virtual space it is radically different to be accused of trespass than to be accused of burglary and in the present case McKinnon entered into sites that had the password left blank so he actually did not "break" into those computers). Why the judge is so keen to extradite a British citizen with such a dubious legal basis when higher English courts have refused to extradite foreigners that committed crimes much more serious? In sum, in most countries (developed and not) a ruling that leaves so many strangely unanswered questions would merit an investigation into the judge’s conduct…
Ruling against Google and Yahoo in Argentina
A district court in
The judge Virginia Simari, has understood that the search engines are also Internet sites and that their owners decide what contents are included on them. She also considered that “the activities of the defendants facilitate the access to sites that otherwise would be of difficult access and that, in addition, such a facilitation constitutes de node of one of their activities”. “Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the search engines by contributing to the access to the websites are in the best technical conditions to prevent the damages, and it is that profile of the search engines that generates their facilitating activity liability”.
The judge also considered that the fact that the claimant’s professional activity requires her public exhibition in different manners does not legitimate any kind of use of Da Cunha’s image by third parties. She went on explaining that “the standard to measure the damage caused to somebody’s image is conformed by the context where the images in question are presented. In the present case the existence of images of the claimant on websites of sexual, erotic, pornographic content does not leave place to doubt about the impact on the claimant’s image”.
Needless to say that it is expected that both Google and Yahoo will appeal the ruling, but what is peculiar is the way that the judge links seamlessly the damage caused by the offending sites with the search engines that allow people to find them. It is similar to finding the maker of telephotos or zooms liable for the breach of privacy that a paparazzi may commit, or car maker liable for robberies committed by car (or the council that has responsibility for the street where the car is driven to the robbery). But it shows a bigger problem that is starting to arise in jurisdictions like the Argentine, that have a sophisticated legal culture and system and also a fairly litigious nature but judges with no understanding of Internet and new technologies functioning or their peculiar legal principles. Some time ago we discussed the string of domain name disputes judicial decisions where Argentine judges found always in favour of trademark owners when the other party had also a legitimate right to the domain name (as, for example, a family name), and here we have the same situation again. It probably relates to the fact that to be a judge in Argentina you need to be a lawyer and to be a lawyer in Argentina you don’t need to know any thing about ICT law nor you can, as all but one universities don’t have any class on the topic…
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Blackboard software patent litigation, round...whatever
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (or the misadventures of proper parenting in an online world)
A recent survey suggests that only one in ten parents talk about Internet safety with their kids and there are some cases where parents get quite amused when their kids wander alone online and get into things that they shouldn’t: take as example the 3 years old kid that bought a real digger online when the parents were sleeping…the mother reaction was “It's been a lot of fun”…was it? Or it was a monumental example of irresponsibility from the parents? Would the mother have the same reaction if instead of buying a digger the kid put herself in contact with another “online kid” that then turned out to be a grown up paedophile (like the recent case in Spain)?
It has been repeated hundreds of times but it doesn’t hurt to do it again; Internet is not the problem but parents that use it as an easy way to keep children entertained instead of guiding them through the intricacies of cyberspace, and there is no regulation that can solve that problem. There is, however, an argument that governments and international organizations should devote more resources to the education and information of parents instead of wasting resources in twisting and violating long established legal principles to maintain the profits of industries with obsolete business models. Governments could, for example, mandate the inclusion in the computer manuals and in the ISP connection packs some form of booklet teaching parents the basics of online safety and that would certaintly be better received than forcing ISPs to control users downloading patterns...
Friday, June 19, 2009
A ruling of U$S174,545.45 per song and a result that the RIAA should cry for
In Capitol v Jammie Thomas-Rasset the jury just handed down a sentence of U$S1,920,000 against the defendant for the wilful copyright infringement of 24 songs, which they found Mrs Thomas-Rasset made available for others to download through Kazaa. The claimant (plaintiff in the case because is in the US), Capitol Records, alleged that the defendant made available to others thousands of songs but it decided to concentrate on 24 songs for which it had more evidence. At the end, it seems that the claimants specialists could only link 11 songs to the defendant’s computer, so the actual tag is not U$S80,000 per song as the jury decided but U$S174,545.45 per song (for the other 13 songs even the claimant’s specialists recognized that they couldn’t probe that they had been actually shared). For the remaining 11 songs, there are suggestions that all the evidence was circumstantial, although a lot of it.
The legal issues that the ruling raises are so many and so contentious that several papers can be written out of it (which for sure they will), but there are a couple that stand out as especially relevant. The first is the clarification that the music industry argument that “making available for download” is copyright infringement in the US is wrong. The case had to be retried because in the original case the judge had instructed the jury that making available for downloading was copyright infringement, which clearly contradicted the letter and spirit of the law. In the new trial, there was some evidence, albeit circumstantial, that somebody had downloaded 11 songs from the defendant’s computer, making her liable for copyright infringement by distributing the protected content (one of the exclusive acts reserved for the copyright holder). The other issue is the amount of damages.
The “loss” of the music industry would be in the range of 70 cents per song, which is what it would get of the 99 cents paid for legally downloading each of the songs in questions, so getting an award of U$S174,545.45 per song seems a “little” excessive and, even more, unconstitutionally excessive. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003), 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a punitive damage award of $145 million when compensatory damages were $1 million were excessive and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the ruling, compensatory damages have as purpose to compensate a plaintiff for a loss, while punitive damages act as a deterrence and retribution and serve the same purpose as criminal penalties. Civil defendants are not afforded constitutional protections given to criminal defendants, therefore, there is a danger of deprivation of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court used BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, where it was established that three factors have to be considered in assessing punitive damages:
1) the degree of reprehensibility of misconduct;
2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damage award; and
3) the difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparative cases.
Futhermore, in order to determine the reprehensibility of misconduct, the most important factors must be:
1) the harm is physical rather than economic;
2) the conduct exhibits indifference or reckless disregard to the health or safety of others;
3) the conduct involves repeated actions rather than an isolated event; and
4) the harm results from intentional malice, trickery or deceit, not just an accident.
Needles to say that the conduct of the defendant Jammie Thomas-Rasset does not get even close to any of the necessary factors needed to justify such a disproportion between the actual loss and the punitive damages.
The RIAA should better put the champagne back in the fridge because when they think that they have won, they actually have handed on a silver plate to those in favour of digital freedom the opportunity to clearly establish that making available for download is not copyright infringement in the US (as already decided) and that their damages cannot not be as outrageous as they currently are.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Harry Potter yet again in court (or trying to get millions magically)
The Australian Daily Telegraph brings the news that the estate of Adrian Jacobs is suing JK Rowling’s publisher, Bloomsbury, for copyright infringement and claiming £500 million. The suit has its origin on the allegation that Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire contains the same concepts presented in Jacobs’ Willy the Wizard, a 36 page book of which 1,000 copies were made.According to the newspaper, the claimants argue that
Both Willy and Harry are required to work out the exact nature of the main task of the contest which they both achieve in a bathroom assisted by clues from helpers, in order to discover how to rescue human hostages imprisoned by a community of half-human, half-animal fantasy creatures, the merpeople in Harry Potter, Mr Markson said in a statement to The Daily Telegraph.
"Many other similarities are described in the Claim filed by the Estate, which include the idea of wizards travelling on trains, famously referred to in Harry Potter as the Hogwarts Express.
"It is alleged that all of these are concepts first created by Adrian Jacobs in Willy the Wizard, some 10 years before JK Rowling first published any of the Harry Potter novels and 13 years before Goblet of Fire was published.
"It is also alleged that, at the time in trying to get his work published, Mr Jacobs sought the services of a literary agent, Christopher Little, who also later became Ms Rowlings literary agent in the Harry Potter series.
Leaving apart the issue that Jacobs’ book was in the hands of whom then became JK Rowlings agent, it seems that the whole lawsuit is based on some ideas being similar and there is where things are difficult to understand. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 in its section 16 (3) makes clear that, subject to some exceptions, it is not necessary to copy the whole work, but it has been clarified in Warwick Film Productions Ltd v Eisinger (1969) that a substantial part of it should be reproduced in order to have infringement. Here it is important to remember that substantial refers to the quality more than the quantity of the copy, as explained by Lord Reid in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd (1964). Furthermore, substantiability refers to being substantial in the copied work and not in the copying one, as decided in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (1998) reaffirmed by the House of Lords in 2001(it would not be a defence to say that Willy the Wizard is one tenth of the Goblet of Fire, because the suit does not claim that JK Rowling is not creative, it claims that Jacobs’ work has been copied). So, it first has to be established how much of the Jacobs’ work is constituted by the parts referred to above.
The other issue relevant to copyright infringement is to address whether the protected work has been reproduced or not and to establish that we need to look at how similar both works are and then if the similarity has been brought by the act of copying. The previous discussion makes clear that the infringing work needs not be identical, but it can be argued that courts have made a huge disfavour to the certainty and clarity of this issue by blurring too much the distinction between expression and idea, distinction that is central to the concept of copyright. The case Ludlow Music Inc v Robbie Williams (2001) is a prime example of courts making an appalling mess of the law of copyright by finding infringement due to one song taking its central idea from other (yes, there is not mistake, the court did refer to copying the idea as infringement!). Generally speaking, the infringing work should reproduce the original in some form, although this does not imply exact word-by-word copying. CDPA 1988 s16 (3)(a) makes clear that reproduction does not need to be exact, which has been interpreted as covering the way of arranging ideas too, in Harman Pictures NV v Osborne (1967). Finally, it is the case Ravenscroft v Herbert (1980) the one that may give the claimants some hope of success because it establishes that an author cannot use the language and arrangement of facts of a previous work (artificially protecting ideas without saying so).
Fortunately, the Da Vinci Code case, Baigent v Random House Group Ltd (2007) put some rationality in the common law arena and established that facts, themes and ideas were open to anyone to use (although the claimants got away with using the courts to make their previously unknown book a best-seller).
So, is this a genuine case or a way to try (yet again) to use courts to change the fact that a writer has written a book that few people want to buy and other has written a different book with some similarities that has sold millions of copies around the globe? The situation is not helped by the involvement of a publicist promoting the action and making a point that Mr Jacobs died penniless and JK Rowling is a billionaire. The law of copyright shouldn’t be concerned with the fact that an ignotus author died poor due to losing everything in the stock market (unrelated to the book or the current action) and it shouldn’t be affected by the sympathy that a publicist is trying to attract to his (?) cause (by the way, in a system with no juries, shouldn’t you get a good lawyers instead of a publicist? or the whole lawsuit is just to make money by becoming a “celebrity”?). But there is quite strong argument that courts are to blame for this type of lawsuits.
In England the characteristics of common law give some flexibility to the law but they also mean that many cases are decided based on the personal preferences of the judges (what is always strongly denied by them or common law analysts), who many times use their rulings to relax or restrict principles that are quite well defined in other jurisdictions., like the distinction between expression and idea. And on the policy side, why a court should protect the way that facts, information and ideas are presented by someone, not the way they are expressed, when other person uses the same way but expresses them in a form that is preferred by the public? Even more, courts in this side of the
Isn’t it time that courts make clear in England that if the public does not like your creation courts are not there to give you a hand paying your bills? And also, although it is true that due to the robes and wigs English courts look like Hogwarts, it is also time that people understand that they are not a place where lack of talent can be magically transformed into millions...
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Is The Times using courts to curtail potential competition?
Today The Times has announced proudly that a “Landmark ruling lifts lid on police blogger”, referring to a case that The Times won against the author of the Nightjack blog (who tried to get an injunction preventing The Times from revealing his name). But is it something to be really proud of? Or, like the music industry using courts to stop the unstoppable and try to save a failed business model, The Times just found an easy case to undermine the activities of some bloggers and went for the part (their anonymity) that may discourage many from revealing some news? Isn’t it the case that the ruling in question will come to hunt newspapers in general and The Times in particular when in the future they try to keep the anonymity of a source that got the information breaking some rule?
The arguments of The Times could be summarized in saying that the name of the blogger did not deserve protection because he was a policeman that was breaking police rules and, therefore, there was public interest in knowing the name of such a rule-breaking public servant. This is a very strange and dangerous proposition to be put forward by a newspaper; haven’t they heard about the Pentagon Papers? Do they think that those that gave the papers to the New York Times and the Washington Post had the authorization to do that? Or probably when The Times published an article on June 29, 1972, referring to and explaining the contents of the Papers did not matter that they had been obtained by breaking the rules (actually a quite serious law in the
Interestingly enough, one of the “analyses” of the ruling that appears on The Times ends by trying to preempt the obvious saying that “ironically [...] there will be plenty of bloggers who […] ‘will argue it has a chilling effect that will deter bloggers from putting information out there’”, quoting an, of course, anonymous lawyer…
Thursday, June 04, 2009
An Argentine copyright case with political implications and little more
A couple of days ago an Argentine judge ordered the ruling party, the Peronism that uses the name Partido Justicialista (well, a coalition called Frente para la Victoria –Front for Victory- purporting to be the party), to stop using the most popular version of the party’s anthem due to a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by the state of Hugo Del Carril, the author and interpreter of the most famous version of the song and one of the undisputed notables of the Peronist Party. Argentina has a quite developed copyright law and it is member of the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and WTO’s TRIPS, all of which establish that authors and performers have exclusive rights to reproduction, distribution to the public and authorization of public performance of their work. These rights of interpreters on recordings can be found in art 56 of the Law Number 11723 (as amended) of Argentina. Until here there is no much of a news more than the political issue created by the son of Hugo Del Carril by denying the use of the song to the group that is currently in the Argentine government because he alleges they are not really peronists, which according to him (and to the judge that concurred) would satisfy the reasons for denial of authorization instituted in the law. However, although not surprising for those versed in Argentine politics and the way that “rule of law” is interpreted there, things started to get strange when the country’s Minister of Justice, Anibal Fernandez, said that “they” would keep using the song as much as they wanted, which was later put into practice in a political meeting of the Frente para la Victoria that was attended by the husband of the current president and candidate to the House of Representatives of the Argentine Congress, Nestor Krichner…beyond the political issue represented by the fact that the Minister of Justice of a country is saying that will ignore a judicial ruling and that the judicial ruling is directed to a political party not to the government (it seems that in some point those in the government of Argentina cannot see the difference) there are several legal issues that deserve a more detailed analysis.
That the state of the singer has the right to not authorize the public performance of the song is beyond question, as established by relevant law and explained by the judge that expressly ruled against continuing its use, making the use of it by the Frente por la Victoria both copyright infringement and contempt to court. Following Argentine obligations under international law, such copyright infringement incurs both civil liability and criminal responsibility, as per articles 71, 72 and, especially, 73 of the mentioned Law 11723 of the Legal Regime of Intellectual Property of Argentina. The civil liability would be incurred by the meeting organizers, the Frente para la Victoria and the one that actually played the song, and the criminal responsibility would lie with the person that played the song because in Argentina criminal responsibility must lie with a physical person. But the problem does not stop there because art 209 of the Argentine Criminal Code makes a crime to “incite to commit a crime” and art 213 of the same code criminalizes the act of being apologetic of the commission of a crime or a criminal, making the Minister’s declaration a clear crime. Furthermore, art 248 of the Argentine Criminal Code creates the crime of not fulfilling the duties of a public officer, which includes issuing orders contrary to the law, as the one in question. Accordingly, when Anibal Fernandez said that “they” would keep using the song in dispute and, therefore, disobeyed a court order, he committed an array of crimes within and outside of the realm of intellectual property law.
Finally, it is an accepted principle of international law that unilateral declaration of public officials can, in some particular circumstances, be binding for countries and affect their status within certain international legal regimes, as established in the case of Denmark v Norway, PICJ (1933)..is the Minister of Justice of Argentina saying that authors and interpreters rights can be ignored and therefore denouncing several international conventions, the TRIPS agreement and Argentina’s obligations under the WTO system?…
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Ooops, they did it again (or something smells bad in Sweden)
The last few days the wires have been busy transmitting information and analysis about the recent Swedish court case that convicted Frederik Neij, Gottfrid Svartholm Warg, Carl Lundstrom and Peter Sunde, who run Pirate Bay, to one year in jail for the crime of copyright infringement. However, today the same case has come to the spotlight for a different reason, showing that, once again, the moral high grounds that the music industry is claiming is actually so low that throws into doubt the reputation of a decent legal system as the Swedish.Today it has been made public that the judge that decided the case against the Pirate Bay members is member of several organizations that either have as main goal to strengthen copyright laws and their enforcement or have as co-members some of the lawyers that represented the music industry in the case…the judge seems to have the peculiar view that belonging to organizations as the Swedish Association of Copyright alongside with Henrik Pontén, Peter Danowsky and Monique Wadsted, who represented rights holders in the Pirate Bay trial, or the Swedish Association for Industrial Property, which pushes for a stronger copyright and has the judge as member of the board, don’t imply that he is biased and that the result of the trial should stand…however, it is clear that the words that John Kennedy, chairman of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), used to describe the outcome of the Swedish case should be supported because the current case "will send out a message, even to kids, that what they thought was OK, isn't" as even in decent Sweden justice seems to be co-opted and tarnished by the entertainment industry…



