Monday, August 27, 2012

SID 2012

We are at SID 2012 (Argentine Symposyum on Law and Informatics) of which I am one of the co-chairs. After more than seven hours the day is resisting to end and we still have two more presentations to go.
The day has had a little of everything, but all interesting and current. The program is here at page 71 (I think) of the whole thing...

Estamos en el SID 2012 (Simposio de Informatica y Derecho) del cual soy uno de los co-chairs. Luego de siete horas el dia se resiste a terminar y todavia tenemos dos presentaciones mas.
El dia tuvo un poco de todo, pero todo interesante y actual. El programa esta aca en la pagina 71 (creo) del mamotreto...

Monday, August 13, 2012

The Return of Electromate/El Regreso de Electromate

After exactly two years without posting on this blog, I think that is time to return to it and to post the same sort of things as before but with more of a bilingual touch so to write in English things that happen in the Spanish speaking world and viceversa...if the force so allows me.

Luego de exactamente dos años sin escribir en este blog, pienso que es hora de regresar al mismo y escribir el mismo tipo de cosas que antes pero con un toque más bilingue, escribiendo en inglés cosas que pasan en el mundo hispánico y vicerversa...si la fuerza me lo permite

Monday, August 23, 2010

"Facebook" list wins elections

A list composed by candidates that met through a Facebook group won the local elections at the beach town of El Condor in the Argentine Patagonia. The list, number 12 for the purposes of the election won the electoral contest against the incumbent, list number 7, getting almost 68% of the votes.
The list was formed by members of the Facebook group “Fanaticos del Balneario El Condor”, who through that group started to “talk” about the possibility of running for office to be the ones administrating the village. It is important to note that the two things the members of the list have in common are being fans of El Condor and Facebook, since as they clarify, regardless the political ideology of the candidates.
El Condor is a village by the sea in the Argentine Patagonia known for its extense beaches, the shallow sea and the practice of kite surfing. It also has the biggest colony of burrowing parrots in the world and it presents visitors with ample opportunities for both shore and boat fishing. 
The election had other IT particularity because one of the poll stations was set up using an electronic ballot box, which constitutes a novelty for the region.

Tuesday, July 13, 2010

Facebook’s new lawsuit

Paul D. Ceglia has filed a lawsuit in a New York Court alleging that he owns 84% of Facebook and, although Facebook is trying to dismiss it as a frivolous lawsuit, the Judge has found it to have enough entity to order a freeze in all asset transactions for Facebook. The issue arises from an allegation made by the plaintiff (claimant in England) that the current Facebook CEO, Zuckerberg, was paid U$S1000 to build the site, on which Ceglia kept 50% of the interest that grew 1% per day from January 1st 2004 until the day of completion, February 4th 2004. This implies that Ceglia owns 84% of the resulting site.
It is not the first time that Zuckerberg and Facebook  get involved into legal trouble originated in him taking either the idea, the code or, in this case, the whole company from somebody’s creativity (besides other cases for many other reasons). Settling this out of court will not help in convincing the more than 500 million users, most of whom are young, that rules are supposed to be complied with and that respecting others’ IP rights is needed...

Consumer Report also does not recommend iPhone 4

As explained in the previous post, it seems that Apple's disregard for costumers and the truth hit a wall with the facts about iPhone 4. The Cuppertino's compny blamed the carrier, then said that it was normal for many phones but Consumer Report tested them and concluded that it was not true: the problem is with the design of the phone and it is no joke...

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

Disregard for the market and the Apple myth

Following a discussion that has years on the making, the company from Cupertino has given a new example that nerds and designers worship the company based on myths and snobbery more than on actual facts. It has been argued a zillion times that Apple products are better designed and built than Microsoft Windows based ones, and there has been always the argument that Microsoft represented the dark side of the force by always putting profits first while Apple was a more innovation and customer focused company. But has been any truth on that?
I have sustained for years that the only true part of the Apple myth is that in the beginning of the personal computer era it took a very bad business decision and that decision relegated it to the borders of the market, where there is a always a group of people that would defy rational analysis and claim that the product they are using is infinitely superior and the rest of the mortals are all idiots. Furthermore, there is a strong argument to support that today's information society and ubiquity of computers owe a lot to IBM and Microsoft opening of the PC and that it would have been much delayed if Apple's ideas of having the same manufacturer making the computer, the chip, the operative system and most of the software were prevailing ones. Just an example of how things could have been from the cost point of view, a Macbook Pro with Intel i5, 4GB RAM and 320 GB HD is U$S 1,799 plus tax when a Sonny VAIO with Intel i5, 4GB RAM and 500 GB HD is U$S799.99 plus tax (not being Sonny normally on the cheap side). In the same argument I also claimed that to know how consumer oriented a company was you needed to give it some important market share, some power, to see its behavior vis-a-vis its potential, smaller, competitors. That situation arrived with the iPod, where Apple had 73,8% of the market share in 2009 and showed how consumer friendly and pro-innovation Apple policies were. Prohibition to add your own apps, own digital format to ensure that you needed to buy from their store, ludicrously restrictive DRM, and the normal speech that their products were so good that if something did not work with them was because they were too advanced. A prime example of that is the Apple-Adobe saga, with Steve Jobs claiming between other things that Flash is an old technology and, therefore, Apple mobile devices don't support it. Without entering into the technical discussion and assuming, for the sake of the argument, that Steve Jobs is right, it ignores that fact that a lot of people actually uses Flash and it is so arrogant as to claim that because internal combustion engine is technologically old we shouldn't sell more petrol and we should force people to walk until they all can afford hydrogen-cell car. But what epitomizes the Apple myth of actual innovation and costumer care is the new iPhone 4.
It has been widely reported that the phone has a serious design flaw resulting from Apple's discovery that its users care more about good design than functionality (or even functioning) but they then will distort the facts to show how rational their choice has been. The story says that when you hold your new iPhone 4 in the normal way that you hold a normal mobile phone the signal strength drops substantially because in order to make it slimmer (and cooler) the phone antenna is the unprotected shinny part that cover the lower end of the phone, which you are touching when you hold it. Furthermore, if you are left-handed, holding it in a way that avoids touching the antenna would be quite impractical and "unnatural". What was the reply from the very innovative and consumer conscious company? ''Just avoid holding it in that way.''
Ars est celare artem

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Lack of technological neutrality as indirect discrimination

The situation could have happened in any European country and the potential buyer/victim be from almost any developing country or the US. After selecting something expensive to buy in a store and having the store attendant to confirm that the items is in stock (most of the times having the item brought to the counter), a valid credit card with sufficient credit limit is not accepted because not having the chip and PIN technology. Once the buyer explains that the policy of not swiping the cards refers to cards that have chip but does not apply to those where the chip is simply not part of the card, normally the attendant or the manager turns into "rude mode" and start to give ridiculous explanations that include phrases like "how do I know that the card is not a fake", not realizing that implying that the buyer is carrying a fake credit card is actually defamatory. But, can they do that?
One tends to think that the store can have any policy it wants regarding to which form of payment accepts and to whom it decides to sell its products, but that thought is oversimplistic and may not be necessarily correct.
Following strictly English contract law, it could be argued that the display of goods constitute an invitation to treat either when the goods are on a shop window (Fisher v Bell 1960) or on the shop's shelves (PSGB v Boots, 1953) and that the buyer makes the offer when requesting the goods (following the classic definition of offer of Carlill v Carbollic Smoke Ball, 1893), offer that the seller has the right to reject and it is normally accepted when the seller takes the payment from the buyer (as when one goes to a supermarket). In the situation in question, that would imply that when trying to pay with a "chipless" credit card the seller simply rejects the offer, but that conclusion has several problems of fact and law.
When a buyer tells the attendant that it wants to buy a particular item he or she makes the offer, which is accepted when the attendant confirms that the goods are in stock and invites the buyer to go to the counter and pay for them. In this situation, paying for the goods and receiving them are steps into the performance of the contract, which the buyer would be complying with by trying to pay with a means of payment established by implication in the same contract when the store displays the logo of the credit card in question. Accordingly, by refusing to take a valid credit card with enough limit to pay for the goods, it is the store the one breaching the contract it has with the buyer. Here it can be pointed out that even in the case of accepting that the store is breaching the contract the buyer only would get a remedy in common law in the case of suffering damages, which don't seem to exist. Still, there could be a case in equity to request specific performance, but is the criminal aspect of the situation the one that deserves further exploration.
When the store advertises a good it does so including a long list of terms that would be attached to the contract to be formed when agreement is reached with the buyer, one of them being that the buyer would be able to pay with a valid credit card that has enough limit belonging to one of the brands advertised on the store's entrance. Therefore, when the store says that its policy is to not accept valid credit or debit cards that have enough limit only because they don't have the chip and PIN technology, it is admitting that is engaging in a misleading commercial practice, as prohibited by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 that incorporates into English law the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Furthermore, since there are consumers that would try to look for a different means of payment instead of simply rejecting the new deal that alters the original terms, it can also be argued that the store is engaging in misrepresentation, which could be both a tort or a crime according to England's Misrepresentation Act of 1967.
But the area that could probably subject the store to a stricter legal scrutiny is discrimination, since it can be easily argued that the store in question is discriminating customers for their national origins. The store would argue that it does not discriminate customers due to their national origin because they would sell to people of any nationality that have credit or debit cards with chip and PIN technology, but since the norm, with really few exceptions, is that you need to be resident of a country to obtain a credit or debit card, those who are residents of countries where the chip and PIN technology has not been deployed are, in fact, precluded from buying in those stores. That situation would fit squarely into indirect discrimination, which "involves the application of an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice to everyone, but it has a disproportionate effect on some people".
Finally, there is the issue of the contract between the store and the credit card brand, which clearly the store is breaching by not accepting valid credit card with sufficient credit limits only due to the use of different technology.

Wednesday, April 07, 2010

Divorce by SMS in Arab countries and the validity of electronic documents


There has been some noise in the cyberspace referring to the so called “electronic divorce”, which seems is making waves in some places, like Jordan. The issue relates to husbands terminating their marriage via a SMS, and the “fashion” has pick up quickly. According to Islamic judges there were 450 divorces via SMS in Jordan in 2009.


Moral questions aside, the legal problems are various and permeate other civil relations beyond the Islamic world. Although according to some interpretations of Islamic law a husband can divorce his wife by openly telling her that he does not want to keep the marriage three times (the triple Talaq), there are issues about certainty of intention and the mental state of the one issuing the statement. Accordingly, many Islamic jurisdictions have introduced the need to document the wish of the husband, not forgetting that the practice usually includes a month between each Talaq in order to ensure that the husband has thought the matter properly and that he is not acting irrationally or under pressure, which brings us back to divorcing via SMS.


There are many, if not most, jurisdictions that recognize the validity of civil documents regardless the mean of transmission, as clearly exemplified by the EC Electronic Commerce Directive, which for commercial contracts says that they cannot be “deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by electronic means”. It is true that the same Directive has a provision allowing member states to exclude from the previous requirements “contracts governed by family law”, but the practice has become to not deny validity to documents and expressions of intent solely based on them being in electronic form. Thus, the practice of divorcing via SMS only follows, and exacerbates, an existing trend.


The reactions from Jordan’s society have been varied, going from those that deny validity to divorcing via SMS, like the Jordanian Women Union, to those like the Ministry of Justice of Jordan that put forward a bill requiring probe that the text message has been sent by the husband and that he was not under pressure to send it.

The issue may seem esoteric or relevant to a particular area of the world, but the characteristics of electronic transactions around the globe would be completely changed if the rebuttable presumption that a message originates from the sender and that he/she has acted without pressure or duress is changed into the need of probing that ab initio...

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

GiKii goes back home

Andres has sent the information that the call for papers and registration is open for Gikii 5. This year it goes back to the city that saw its birth, Edinburgh, but a couple of months earlier, June. Described as "a workshop concerned with exploring the legal interaction between popular culture, speculative fiction, and new technologies" Gikii is a place in the space-time continuum that does not challenge the traditional view of what an academic conference is but it destroys it reducing it to mere intergalactic dust craving for some gravitational force in the form of a black gown to put it back together.
A plus, Edinburgh is really nice in June and you can explore the lenght of the Royal Mile looking for that obscure bottle that has not been chill-filtered and has a hand-written label...

Tuesday, March 02, 2010

Call for papers for the Argentine Symposium on Informatics and Law (SID)


39 JAIIO - 39 JORNADAS ARGENTINAS DE INFORMÁTICA -
30 de Agosto al 3 de Septiembre de 2010
Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires

SADIO, la Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa organiza desde hace 38 años las JAIIO (Jornadas Argentinas de Informática e Investigación Operativa) integrando trabajos, investigaciones y actividades bajo un mismo evento. Las JAIIO constituyen uno de los eventos más importantes del sector informático nacional y regional, con presentaciones y exposiciones provenientes tanto de la academia como de la industria.

La organización de las JAIIO contempla un conjunto de simposios separados por área temática, entre las que se incluyen: ingeniería de software, inteligencia artificial, tecnología, agroinformática, high-performance computing, informática industrial, software libre, derecho, salud, sociedad de la información, y un concurso de trabajos estudiantiles. Luego de varios años, las JAIIO vuelven a tener sede en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.

SID 2010 - SIMPOSIO ARGENTINO DE INFORMÁTICA Y DERECHO
30 y 31 de Agosto de 2010

Mucho tiempo ha pasado desde 1961, en que se iniciaron las JAIIO. El mundo fue cambiando y la presencia de la tecnología en general y de la informática en particular se fue incorporando en la vida de amplios segmentos sociales.
En este devenir de las JAIIO, en el 2001 nace el Primer Simposio Argentino de Informática y Derecho (SID), en cuyo seno se empieza a discutir, en la Argentina, la incipiente pero necesaria relación entre la informática y el derecho.
Mucho se ha avanzado desde entonces en la relación entre Derecho e Informática, pero son cada vez más las cuestiones que, en razón del desarrollo tecnológico, la realidad nos propone y es cada vez más necesaria la búsqueda de la excelencia, la creatividad, y el esfuerzo compartido para avanzar en un único y superior sentido: el mejoramiento de la sociedad. De ahí la permanente actualidad, vigencia y crecimiento del SID.
Con el mismo espíritu pionero del primer día, la comunidad académico-científica de "Informática y Derecho" de Latinoamérica, se reúne en Buenos Aires, en torno al SID 2010, para compartir, aprender, debatir y proponer.

CHAIRS DEL SIMPOSIO
-Prof. Abog. Noemí Olivera, GECSI, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina
-Prof. Dr. Aires José Rover, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil

COMITÉ ACADÉMICO DEL SIMPOSIO
-Aída Noblia (AEU, Uruguay)
-Ana Haydee Di Iorio (Fasta, Argentina)
-Araceli N. Proto (CIC FI.UBA, Argentina)
-Ariel Vercelli (UNQ, Argentina)
-Bibiana Luz Clara (Fasta, Argentina)
-Carlos E. Bisso (UNLP, Argentina)
-Carola Canelo (Universidad de Chile, Chile)
-Clara Smith (UNLP, Argentina)
-Claudio Augusto Delrieux (UNPA, Argentina)
-Erick Iriarte Ahon (ALFA-REDI, Perú)
-Fernando Barrio (UNRN, Argentina)
-Fernando Galindo (Universidad de Zaragoza, España)
-Fernando Greco (Ministerio Público de la Provincia de Buenos Aires)
-Gustavo Presman (USAL, Argentina)
-Horacio Fernández Delpech (Presidente ADIAR, Argentina)
-Hugo Cesar Hoeschl (IJURIS, Florianópolis, SC ? Brasil)
-José Miguel Busquets (Universidad de la República, Uruguay)
-Juan Carlos Ponz (UNLP-CALP, Argentina)
-Leopoldo Sebastián Gómez (Poder Judicial Neuquén, Argentina)
-Marcelo Riquert (UNMdP, Argentina)
-María de las Nieves Cenicacelaya (UNLP, Argentina)
-María Florencia Franchini (UNLP, Argentina)
-María Laura Spina (UNL, Argentina)
-Nora Chaponick (INFOLEG, Argentina)
-Orides Mezzaroba (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil)
-Ramón Brenna (UBA, Argentina)
-Rita Gajate (UNLP, Argentina)
-Ricardo Sebastián Piana (UNLP, Argentina)
-Roberto N. Bugallo (UBA-UNCPBA-UNLP)
-Tania Cristina D'Agostini Bueno (Universidade Federal de Santa, Catarina, Brasil)


CALL FOR PAPERS SID 2010
El Comité Académico del Simposio Argentino de Informática y Derecho convoca a los autores interesados a presentar sus trabajos, en las siguientes modalidades:
-Investigaciones que contengan aportes novedosos y debidamente sustentados y que no estén siendo presentados en otras conferencias. (1)
-Prestaciones de casos reales que demuestren impactos significativos, positivos o no, en la gestión informática del derecho.

En ambas modalidades se deberá hacer hincapié en la generación y transmisión de conocimiento que pueda ser apropiado por otros.
(1) En caso que el trabajo sea afín a más de un simposio de las 39 JAIIO, presentarlo indicando los simposios a los que considera puede ajustarse para su evaluación conjunta.

TEMÁTICAS DE LOS TRABAJOS
Los trabajos a presentar deben estar directamente relacionados con, por lo menos, alguna de las siguientes temáticas, sean trabajos disciplinares de Derecho o Informática o interdisciplinarios:
-El Derecho en la Sociedad de la Información.
-El Derecho Informático.
- La privacidad en entornos digitales.
-La propiedad intelectual en la Sociedad de la Información.
-Teletrabajo.
-Comercio electrónico.
-Derechos del Consumidor de productos y/o servicios informáticos.
-Correo electrónico.
-Firma Digital.
-Factura electrónica.
-E-banking: Modelos, problemas, operatorias, seguridad.
-Delitos Informáticos.
-Pericias informáticas.
-Jurisdicción y competencia en la red.
-Resolución de conflictos en el entorno electrónico.
-Gobierno electrónico.
-Democracia electrónica.
-Redes sociales.
-Archivos digitales.
-Informática jurídica.
-Seguridad informática.
-Ontología aplicada al derecho.
-Inteligencia Artificial y Derecho.

PRESENTACIÓN DE LOS TRABAJOS
-Las instrucciones detalladas para la presentación de trabajos serán publicadas a la brevedad en el sitio web del simposio
-Los autores deberán indicar si consideran que sus trabajos pueden ser compartidos con otros simposios.
-Los autores de trabajos aprobados podrán ser invitados a exponer los mismos durante el desarrollo del Simposio.
-Los trabajos deberán tener un máximo de 15 páginas en papel A4 y deben incluir un abstract de hasta 200 palabras, en español o portugués y en inglés El formato de los trabajos es .pdf, cuya plantilla puede descargarse de http://www.springer.com/computer/lncs/lncs+authors?SGWID=0-40209-0-0-0
. Se recomienda muy especialmente respetar el formato especificado.
-Los artículos deberán estar escritos en: castellano, portugués o inglés.
-Al menos uno de los autores de los trabajos aprobados deberá estar registrado en la conferencia con anterioridad a la fecha limite para la presentación definitiva de trabajos (camera ready) a fin de que el mismo sea considerado para su publicación.

FECHAS IMPORTANTES
Fecha límite para la recepción de trabajos: 03 de mayo de 2010 Notificación a los autores: 14 de junio de 2010 Fecha límite para la presentación definitiva de trabajos (camera
ready): 28 de Junio 2010
Inicio de las 39Jaiio: 30 de agosto

Sunday, November 08, 2009

New Ibero American Network of Law and New Technologies

More than three months have past since the last posting on this blog and every day that passes it becomes more difficult to re-start to write on it. Not because there are no topics or will to do it but because so many things have happened since the end of July in the e-commerce, IP, IT and related areas that one wouldn’t know where to start from. So, I was waiting for the opportunity, topic that would act as excuse to return to cyberspace and I found it in the creation of the Red Iberoamericana del Derecho y las Nuevas Tecnologias (Ibero American Network for Law and New Technologies) that a friend and colleague, Guillermo Zamora, has started with Marcelo Temperini in Argentina.

The network is presented as a Spanish speaking (at least for now) community of professionals of law and new technologies with the aim of lending a space to be up-to-date, share experiences, ask questions, participate in discussions, Express opinions and, above all, improve relationships. There are three categories of users, or members, which differ in the degree of discount that they receive in the different activities organized by the network, but all having access to most of its features. These features include writing articles, take part in the discussions, recommend legislation or links, organize publications, be part of the network of professionals for the purposes of referrals, invite friends, recommend events and search for information.

It seems that the idea and the platform have been very well thought and the only thing missing is to form part of it…

Friday, July 31, 2009

Too many strange unanswered questions in the McKinnon extradition case

On Friday the English High Court ruled that Gary McKinnon, who fought a long legal battle to avoid being extradited to the U.S. after he was charged with breaking into 97 computers belonging to different branches of the US Government and military in 2001, should face extradition because that represented ''a lawful and proportionate response to his offending.'' Did it?
When one starts to analyse the case there are far too many questions that remain unanswered and make difficult to explain the willingness of English judges to pay such a deference to the US government, which would clearly and legally not do the same if the situation was the other way around. It is important to begin by pointing out that the judiciary is part or a branch of the state that has, as explicit and historic purpose, to serve the interest of the nation (of which its citizens are part). Within that context, even in this world of complex interdependence, the international relations and international agreements of a country have, as ultimate purpose, to give some benefit to a nation and its citizens. Accordingly, to send a country’s citizen to be tried abroad for a crime that has been committed, very likely, both in England and abroad seems very, highly, strangely unusual and it would take from a judge an exercise of imaginative interpretation that would put him very close to disregarding the right to a fair trail, as established by article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and incorporated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998.
There is little doubt about the fact that what McKinnon did in 2001 was and is a crime under both American and English law and, again, it is not easy to explain, regardless the judge and CPS 's spin on it, why a UK national is not tried within UK.
Now, in the unlikely, but possible situation where it is decided that the crime was committed only in the US, can the defendant still be tried in the UK?
Under international law principles, courts can assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on the nexus between the court, the defendant and the crime. Courts can (and normally do) follow the territoriality nexus where the defendant is tried in the forum where the crime was committed. In this particular scenario, deciding where the crime took place would be paramount to know where McKinnon should be tried. Here again, the proper application of statutory and case law to the facts of the case seems to lead to the unequivocal conclusion that a crime has also been committed in the UK. Jurisdiction can also be established based on the nationality nexus, where the defendant is tried within its own country regardless of the place where the offence has been committed. Here again, taking into account that the ultimate purpose of the organization of the state is to act for the benefit of the country and its citizens, courts would normally use this form of asserting jurisdictions where by doing so they understand that a national would not be punished for a crime committed abroad that the home country considers to be serious enough or, on the contrary, the citizen would receive a punishment that results too harsh or disproportionate for that country’s standards. In the case of English law, when dealing with murder and manslaughter, the English courts have jurisdiction over offences committed abroad, if it was committed by a British citizen as established by section 9 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 3 of the British Nationality Act 1948, and confirmed in R v Cheong (2006) AER (D) 385. There have been also plenty of cases recently where the British Government has requested a British national to be sent to England to be tried for crimes committed abroad but that would have a disproportionate sentence in other country. In the case of McKinnon, even in the unlikely case that it is understood that his crime was committed only in the US, English courts have the legal basis to assert jurisdiction over him and try him here, and taking into account the ultimate purpose of the state, already mentioned before, they must do so.
And all of that without entering into the many other questions that the case arises…
Why, taking into account that the article 8 of the US-UK extradition treaty is so imbalanced in favour of the US and also taking into account the known and acknowledged lack of respect for international law and due process to foreigners and in some cases American citizen (has the judge heard about Guantanamo, the Salgado case, Padilla and hundred of others), the judge still thinks that the response is proportionate? Last week a paedophile that raped a boy was sentenced to 4 years of prison here in England while McKinnon could get a sentence several times longer in the US for entering into those computers looking for information about UFOs, is that proportional? Why the press keeps referring to the hacker “breaking” into the American sites when the hacker actually “entered” into them? (the difference is fundamental because in the non-virtual space it is radically different to be accused of trespass than to be accused of burglary and in the present case McKinnon entered into sites that had the password left blank so he actually did not "break" into those computers). Why the judge is so keen to extradite a British citizen with such a dubious legal basis when higher English courts have refused to extradite foreigners that committed crimes much more serious? In sum, in most countries (developed and not) a ruling that leaves so many strangely unanswered questions would merit an investigation into the judge’s conduct…

Ruling against Google and Yahoo in Argentina

A district court in Argentina has ruled that Google and Yahoo have to pay A$ 50,000 in damages for indexing pages where the name of Virginha Da Cunha and her image have been linked to sexual and erotic content. The claimant, an actress, singer and composer (not being in Argentina never heard about her before), sued the search engines alleging the illegal use of her image and claiming A$ 50,000 in material and “moral” damages from each of the named search engine companies.

The judge Virginia Simari, has understood that the search engines are also Internet sites and that their owners decide what contents are included on them. She also considered that “the activities of the defendants facilitate the access to sites that otherwise would be of difficult access and that, in addition, such a facilitation constitutes de node of one of their activities”. “Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the search engines by contributing to the access to the websites are in the best technical conditions to prevent the damages, and it is that profile of the search engines that generates their facilitating activity liability”.

The judge also considered that the fact that the claimant’s professional activity requires her public exhibition in different manners does not legitimate any kind of use of Da Cunha’s image by third parties. She went on explaining that “the standard to measure the damage caused to somebody’s image is conformed by the context where the images in question are presented. In the present case the existence of images of the claimant on websites of sexual, erotic, pornographic content does not leave place to doubt about the impact on the claimant’s image”.

Needless to say that it is expected that both Google and Yahoo will appeal the ruling, but what is peculiar is the way that the judge links seamlessly the damage caused by the offending sites with the search engines that allow people to find them. It is similar to finding the maker of telephotos or zooms liable for the breach of privacy that a paparazzi may commit, or car maker liable for robberies committed by car (or the council that has responsibility for the street where the car is driven to the robbery). But it shows a bigger problem that is starting to arise in jurisdictions like the Argentine, that have a sophisticated legal culture and system and also a fairly litigious nature but judges with no understanding of Internet and new technologies functioning or their peculiar legal principles. Some time ago we discussed the string of domain name disputes judicial decisions where Argentine judges found always in favour of trademark owners when the other party had also a legitimate right to the domain name (as, for example, a family name), and here we have the same situation again. It probably relates to the fact that to be a judge in Argentina you need to be a lawyer and to be a lawyer in Argentina you don’t need to know any thing about ICT law nor you can, as all but one universities don’t have any class on the topic…

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Blackboard software patent litigation, round...whatever

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits ruled on Monday that part of Blackboard’s U.S. Patent No. 6,988,138 (“the ’138 patent”), which claims an Internet-based educational support system and related methods, is invalid, and reversed the lower court decision that imposed damages of U$S 3,300,000 to Desire2Learn for infringing that patent. The later company has always argued that Blackboard course management patents are overly broad and were issued improperly, which, as noted by the Court, would run against the principles established in Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“consideration of the understanding of one skilled in the art in no way relieves the patentee of adequately disclosing sufficient structure in the specification”). The ruling still leaves some of Blackboard’s claims standing, which, in addition to the already announced appeal, promises to lead to yet more litigation on the matter…

Wednesday, July 08, 2009

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (or the misadventures of proper parenting in an online world)

Newspapers carry the news that yet another girl has been abducted after online grooming and it seems that we could have a news service devoted to things that children have been doing (and they shouldn’t) online and/or what some depraved people have done (or tried to do) to children by using Internet. Probably more than half of the time/space of that news service would be filled with analysis about how dangerous new technologies in general and Internet in particular are for children…and they would be wrong. Information technologies and Internet have the potential to allow children to reach places that we couldn’t dream about when having the same age or allow them to interact with people across the globe and learn about other cultures in ways that no book or library would, but in the same way that children need to be taught how to read, they need to be taught about how to use ICT…and most parents neglect that.
A recent survey suggests that only one in ten parents talk about Internet safety with their kids and there are some cases where parents get quite amused when their kids wander alone online and get into things that they shouldn’t: take as example the 3 years old kid that bought a real digger online when the parents were sleeping…the mother reaction was “It's been a lot of fun”…was it? Or it was a monumental example of irresponsibility from the parents? Would the mother have the same reaction if instead of buying a digger the kid put herself in contact with another “online kid” that then turned out to be a grown up paedophile (like the recent case in Spain)?
It has been repeated hundreds of times but it doesn’t hurt to do it again; Internet is not the problem but parents that use it as an easy way to keep children entertained instead of guiding them through the intricacies of cyberspace, and there is no regulation that can solve that problem. There is, however, an argument that governments and international organizations should devote more resources to the education and information of parents instead of wasting resources in twisting and violating long established legal principles to maintain the profits of industries with obsolete business models. Governments could, for example, mandate the inclusion in the computer manuals and in the ISP connection packs some form of booklet teaching parents the basics of online safety and that would certaintly be better received than forcing ISPs to control users downloading patterns...

Friday, June 19, 2009

A ruling of U$S174,545.45 per song and a result that the RIAA should cry for

In Capitol v Jammie Thomas-Rasset the jury just handed down a sentence of U$S1,920,000 against the defendant for the wilful copyright infringement of 24 songs, which they found Mrs Thomas-Rasset made available for others to download through Kazaa. The claimant (plaintiff in the case because is in the US), Capitol Records, alleged that the defendant made available to others thousands of songs but it decided to concentrate on 24 songs for which it had more evidence. At the end, it seems that the claimants specialists could only link 11 songs to the defendant’s computer, so the actual tag is not U$S80,000 per song as the jury decided but U$S174,545.45 per song (for the other 13 songs even the claimant’s specialists recognized that they couldn’t probe that they had been actually shared). For the remaining 11 songs, there are suggestions that all the evidence was circumstantial, although a lot of it.
The legal issues that the ruling raises are so many and so contentious that several papers can be written out of it (which for sure they will), but there are a couple that stand out as especially relevant. The first is the clarification that the music industry argument that “making available for download” is copyright infringement in the US is wrong. The case had to be retried because in the original case the judge had instructed the jury that making available for downloading was copyright infringement, which clearly contradicted the letter and spirit of the law. In the new trial, there was some evidence, albeit circumstantial, that somebody had downloaded 11 songs from the defendant’s computer, making her liable for copyright infringement by distributing the protected content (one of the exclusive acts reserved for the copyright holder). The other issue is the amount of damages.
The “loss” of the music industry would be in the range of 70 cents per song, which is what it would get of the 99 cents paid for legally downloading each of the songs in questions, so getting an award of U$S174,545.45 per song seems a “little” excessive and, even more, unconstitutionally excessive. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003), 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a punitive damage award of $145 million when compensatory damages were $1 million were excessive and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the ruling, compensatory damages have as purpose to compensate a plaintiff for a loss, while punitive damages act as a deterrence and retribution and serve the same purpose as criminal penalties. Civil defendants are not afforded constitutional protections given to criminal defendants, therefore, there is a danger of deprivation of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court used BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, where it was established that three factors have to be considered in assessing punitive damages:

1) the degree of reprehensibility of misconduct;
2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damage award; and
3) the difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparative cases.

Futhermore, in order to determine the reprehensibility of misconduct, the most important factors must be:

1) the harm is physical rather than economic;
2) the conduct exhibits indifference or reckless disregard to the health or safety of others;
3) the conduct involves repeated actions rather than an isolated event; and
4) the harm results from intentional malice, trickery or deceit, not just an accident.


Needles to say that the conduct of the defendant Jammie Thomas-Rasset does not get even close to any of the necessary factors needed to justify such a disproportion between the actual loss and the punitive damages.
The RIAA should better put the champagne back in the fridge because when they think that they have won, they actually have handed on a silver plate to those in favour of digital freedom the opportunity to clearly establish that making available for download is not copyright infringement in the US (as already decided) and that their damages cannot not be as outrageous as they currently are.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Harry Potter yet again in court (or trying to get millions magically)

The Australian Daily Telegraph brings the news that the estate of Adrian Jacobs is suing JK Rowling’s publisher, Bloomsbury, for copyright infringement and claiming £500 million. The suit has its origin on the allegation that Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire contains the same concepts presented in Jacobs’ Willy the Wizard, a 36 page book of which 1,000 copies were made.

According to the newspaper, the claimants argue that

Both Willy and Harry are required to work out the exact nature of the main task of the contest which they both achieve in a bathroom assisted by clues from helpers, in order to discover how to rescue human hostages imprisoned by a community of half-human, half-animal fantasy creatures, the merpeople in Harry Potter, Mr Markson said in a statement to The Daily Telegraph.

"Many other similarities are described in the Claim filed by the Estate, which include the idea of wizards travelling on trains, famously referred to in Harry Potter as the Hogwarts Express.

"It is alleged that all of these are concepts first created by Adrian Jacobs in Willy the Wizard, some 10 years before JK Rowling first published any of the Harry Potter novels and 13 years before Goblet of Fire was published.

"It is also alleged that, at the time in trying to get his work published, Mr Jacobs sought the services of a literary agent, Christopher Little, who also later became Ms Rowlings literary agent in the Harry Potter series.

Leaving apart the issue that Jacobs’ book was in the hands of whom then became JK Rowlings agent, it seems that the whole lawsuit is based on some ideas being similar and there is where things are difficult to understand. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 in its section 16 (3) makes clear that, subject to some exceptions, it is not necessary to copy the whole work, but it has been clarified in Warwick Film Productions Ltd v Eisinger (1969) that a substantial part of it should be reproduced in order to have infringement. Here it is important to remember that substantial refers to the quality more than the quantity of the copy, as explained by Lord Reid in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd (1964). Furthermore, substantiability refers to being substantial in the copied work and not in the copying one, as decided in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (1998) reaffirmed by the House of Lords in 2001(it would not be a defence to say that Willy the Wizard is one tenth of the Goblet of Fire, because the suit does not claim that JK Rowling is not creative, it claims that Jacobs’ work has been copied). So, it first has to be established how much of the Jacobs’ work is constituted by the parts referred to above.

The other issue relevant to copyright infringement is to address whether the protected work has been reproduced or not and to establish that we need to look at how similar both works are and then if the similarity has been brought by the act of copying. The previous discussion makes clear that the infringing work needs not be identical, but it can be argued that courts have made a huge disfavour to the certainty and clarity of this issue by blurring too much the distinction between expression and idea, distinction that is central to the concept of copyright. The case Ludlow Music Inc v Robbie Williams (2001) is a prime example of courts making an appalling mess of the law of copyright by finding infringement due to one song taking its central idea from other (yes, there is not mistake, the court did refer to copying the idea as infringement!). Generally speaking, the infringing work should reproduce the original in some form, although this does not imply exact word-by-word copying. CDPA 1988 s16 (3)(a) makes clear that reproduction does not need to be exact, which has been interpreted as covering the way of arranging ideas too, in Harman Pictures NV v Osborne (1967). Finally, it is the case Ravenscroft v Herbert (1980) the one that may give the claimants some hope of success because it establishes that an author cannot use the language and arrangement of facts of a previous work (artificially protecting ideas without saying so).

Fortunately, the Da Vinci Code case, Baigent v Random House Group Ltd (2007) put some rationality in the common law arena and established that facts, themes and ideas were open to anyone to use (although the claimants got away with using the courts to make their previously unknown book a best-seller).

So, is this a genuine case or a way to try (yet again) to use courts to change the fact that a writer has written a book that few people want to buy and other has written a different book with some similarities that has sold millions of copies around the globe? The situation is not helped by the involvement of a publicist promoting the action and making a point that Mr Jacobs died penniless and JK Rowling is a billionaire. The law of copyright shouldn’t be concerned with the fact that an ignotus author died poor due to losing everything in the stock market (unrelated to the book or the current action) and it shouldn’t be affected by the sympathy that a publicist is trying to attract to his (?) cause (by the way, in a system with no juries, shouldn’t you get a good lawyers instead of a publicist? or the whole lawsuit is just to make money by becoming a “celebrity”?). But there is quite strong argument that courts are to blame for this type of lawsuits.

In England the characteristics of common law give some flexibility to the law but they also mean that many cases are decided based on the personal preferences of the judges (what is always strongly denied by them or common law analysts), who many times use their rulings to relax or restrict principles that are quite well defined in other jurisdictions., like the distinction between expression and idea. And on the policy side, why a court should protect the way that facts, information and ideas are presented by someone, not the way they are expressed, when other person uses the same way but expresses them in a form that is preferred by the public? Even more, courts in this side of the Atlantic seem to be lenient to claimants that use the courts to change their lack of success in the market even when the claim can be understood as frivolous and without merit. Across the pond, however, courts have been less reluctant to deal nicely with this type of lawsuits and in Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer 221 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) the judge fined Ms Stouffer U$S50,000 for her “pattern of intentional bad faith conduct” and in Canada a judge ordered Kim Baryluk, the song writer behind the almost unknown The Wyrd Sisters band that sued Waner Bros for CAD40,000 for…no reason, to pay the CAD140,000 legal costs of the defendant.

Isn’t it time that courts make clear in England that if the public does not like your creation courts are not there to give you a hand paying your bills? And also, although it is true that due to the robes and wigs English courts look like Hogwarts, it is also time that people understand that they are not a place where lack of talent can be magically transformed into millions...

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Is The Times using courts to curtail potential competition?

Today The Times has announced proudly that a “Landmark ruling lifts lid on police blogger”, referring to a case that The Times won against the author of the Nightjack blog (who tried to get an injunction preventing The Times from revealing his name). But is it something to be really proud of? Or, like the music industry using courts to stop the unstoppable and try to save a failed business model, The Times just found an easy case to undermine the activities of some bloggers and went for the part (their anonymity) that may discourage many from revealing some news? Isn’t it the case that the ruling in question will come to hunt newspapers in general and The Times in particular when in the future they try to keep the anonymity of a source that got the information breaking some rule?

The arguments of The Times could be summarized in saying that the name of the blogger did not deserve protection because he was a policeman that was breaking police rules and, therefore, there was public interest in knowing the name of such a rule-breaking public servant. This is a very strange and dangerous proposition to be put forward by a newspaper; haven’t they heard about the Pentagon Papers? Do they think that those that gave the papers to the New York Times and the Washington Post had the authorization to do that? Or probably when The Times published an article on June 29, 1972, referring to and explaining the contents of the Papers did not matter that they had been obtained by breaking the rules (actually a quite serious law in the US)? One of The Times analysts tries to make a link between the ruling and freedom of information, clearly ignoring the quite precise meaning that freedom of information has in that setting. class="MsoNormal">Finally, The Times also engages in some silly form of character assassination by trying to show how bad the activities of the blogger were, but nothing helps to change the sensation that, legalities apart (the disputable ruling of the judge deserves a full paper on it), something is quite wrong on the ethical side of The Times.

Interestingly enough, one of the “analyses” of the ruling that appears on The Times ends by trying to preempt the obvious saying that “ironically [...] there will be plenty of bloggers who […] ‘will argue it has a chilling effect that will deter bloggers from putting information out there’”, quoting an, of course, anonymous lawyer…

Thursday, June 04, 2009

An Argentine copyright case with political implications and little more

After more than a month away from this version of cyberspace, some strange IP news brings me back to drink legal mate (and leave my marking for a while).
A couple of days ago an Argentine judge ordered the ruling party, the Peronism that uses the name Partido Justicialista (well, a coalition called Frente para la Victoria –Front for Victory- purporting to be the party), to stop using the most popular version of the party’s anthem due to a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by the state of Hugo Del Carril, the author and interpreter of the most famous version of the song and one of the undisputed notables of the Peronist Party. Argentina has a quite developed copyright law and it is member of the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and WTO’s TRIPS, all of which establish that authors and performers have exclusive rights to reproduction, distribution to the public and authorization of public performance of their work. These rights of interpreters on recordings can be found in art 56 of the Law Number 11723 (as amended) of Argentina. Until here there is no much of a news more than the political issue created by the son of Hugo Del Carril by denying the use of the song to the group that is currently in the Argentine government because he alleges they are not really peronists, which according to him (and to the judge that concurred) would satisfy the reasons for denial of authorization instituted in the law. However, although not surprising for those versed in Argentine politics and the way that “rule of law” is interpreted there, things started to get strange when the country’s Minister of Justice, Anibal Fernandez, said that “they” would keep using the song as much as they wanted, which was later put into practice in a political meeting of the Frente para la Victoria that was attended by the husband of the current president and candidate to the House of Representatives of the Argentine Congress, Nestor Krichner…beyond the political issue represented by the fact that the Minister of Justice of a country is saying that will ignore a judicial ruling and that the judicial ruling is directed to a political party not to the government (it seems that in some point those in the government of Argentina cannot see the difference) there are several legal issues that deserve a more detailed analysis.
That the state of the singer has the right to not authorize the public performance of the song is beyond question, as established by relevant law and explained by the judge that expressly ruled against continuing its use, making the use of it by the Frente por la Victoria both copyright infringement and contempt to court. Following Argentine obligations under international law, such copyright infringement incurs both civil liability and criminal responsibility, as per articles 71, 72 and, especially, 73 of the mentioned Law 11723 of the Legal Regime of Intellectual Property of Argentina. The civil liability would be incurred by the meeting organizers, the Frente para la Victoria and the one that actually played the song, and the criminal responsibility would lie with the person that played the song because in Argentina criminal responsibility must lie with a physical person. But the problem does not stop there because art 209 of the Argentine Criminal Code makes a crime to “incite to commit a crime” and art 213 of the same code criminalizes the act of being apologetic of the commission of a crime or a criminal, making the Minister’s declaration a clear crime. Furthermore, art 248 of the Argentine Criminal Code creates the crime of not fulfilling the duties of a public officer, which includes issuing orders contrary to the law, as the one in question. Accordingly, when Anibal Fernandez said that “they” would keep using the song in dispute and, therefore, disobeyed a court order, he committed an array of crimes within and outside of the realm of intellectual property law.
Finally, it is an accepted principle of international law that unilateral declaration of public officials can, in some particular circumstances, be binding for countries and affect their status within certain international legal regimes, as established in the case of Denmark v Norway, PICJ (1933)..is the Minister of Justice of Argentina saying that authors and interpreters rights can be ignored and therefore denouncing several international conventions, the TRIPS agreement and Argentina’s obligations under the WTO system?…

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Ooops, they did it again (or something smells bad in Sweden)

The last few days the wires have been busy transmitting information and analysis about the recent Swedish court case that convicted Frederik Neij, Gottfrid Svartholm Warg, Carl Lundstrom and Peter Sunde, who run Pirate Bay, to one year in jail for the crime of copyright infringement. However, today the same case has come to the spotlight for a different reason, showing that, once again, the moral high grounds that the music industry is claiming is actually so low that throws into doubt the reputation of a decent legal system as the Swedish.
Today it has been made public that the judge that decided the case against the Pirate Bay members is member of several organizations that either have as main goal to strengthen copyright laws and their enforcement or have as co-members some of the lawyers that represented the music industry in the case…the judge seems to have the peculiar view that belonging to organizations as the Swedish Association of Copyright alongside with Henrik Pontén, Peter Danowsky and Monique Wadsted, who represented rights holders in the Pirate Bay trial, or the Swedish Association for Industrial Property, which pushes for a stronger copyright and has the judge as member of the board, don’t imply that he is biased and that the result of the trial should stand…however, it is clear that the words that John Kennedy, chairman of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), used to describe the outcome of the Swedish case should be supported because the current case "will send out a message, even to kids, that what they thought was OK, isn't" as even in decent Sweden justice seems to be co-opted and tarnished by the entertainment industry…